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Abstract. This paper discusses the relation between centralization in union bargaining and 
the wage-(un)employment mix. Empirical findings point to a positive relation between the 
degree of coordination in union bargaining and wages till a certain point, and a negative one 
afterwards. A theoretical argument fits such evidence, relying on the mechanism behind the 
free-rider problem in union bargaining. If earnings taxes were introduced to finance the 
unemployment insurance fund, that relation could change. The impact on the equilibrium 
wages and multipliers in the several scenarios is briefly explored. Indirectly, an explanation 
for the shape of the empirical “wage curve” is also derived.  
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1. Introduction  
mpirical findings point to a positive relation between the degree of 
coordination or centralization in union bargaining and wages (or, 
rather, the unemployment rate) till a certain point, and a negative 
one at high levels of centralization 2 . We depart from an argument 
previously stated in the literature which explains part of the observed 
relation (wage increases with centralization when bargaining is 
decentralized) - exposed in section 1 -, and suggest - in section 2 - an 
explanation for the other part (after some degree of centralization, wage 
decreases with it).  
We do not invoke for the explanation any efficient bargaining 
considerations 3: a closed shop monopoly union environment with respect 
to the target (firm, industry or total economy) is always assumed; unions 
maximize collective income. Also, monetary considerations are “sterilized” 
– unions and firms perform in a real environment. The difference in 
behavior results from the way unions perceive the alternative to 
employment of their members; with economy-wide bargaining, 
unemployment is certain and necessarily internalised in union's 
expectations; with decentralised union bargaining, eventually dismissed 
unemployed members are seen as competing for any union´s jobs. 
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If unemployed, members receive the unemployment benefit; employed 
members face earnings taxes. It is likely that unions, as workers, are 
responsive to after-tax wages. This motivates section 3, that briefly 
contrasts the two equilibrium outcomes under income taxation.  
Going a step further, it can be that the unemployment benefit bill is 
passed on to employed members through the tax system. In section 4, we 
compare the two wage bargaining arrangements for the case where 
earnings taxes are levied to finance the unemployment benefit 4 . 
Interestingly, the relation between wages and coordination in union 
bargaining could be reversed, with economy-wide bargaining generating 
higher wages than industry bargaining. 
The exposition ends with a brief summary of the main conclusions in 
section 5. 
 
2. Firm and industry-wide bargaining 
1. Suppose unions maximize members´ earnings, and behave in a 
decentralized way. Each union solves 
 
Max    W L + Wa (M - L)        (1) 
L, W 
 s.t.: L = L(W) 
 
where W denotes the wage achieved by union members, L employment, 
Wa, the alternative received by unemployed members, and M the 
exogenous number of union members; L(W) is the demand for union 
members´ labor, a negatively sloped function, i.e., L´(W) < 0. The union will 
pick 5: 
 
W  =  
WL,
a
1 - 1 
 W
η
   ;   W ≥ Wa        (2) 
and      
a
a
W
 W-W 
  =  
1 - 
1
WL,η
  ;  
W
 W-W a   =  
WL,
1
η
   
 
where ηL,W  = - L(W)
 W(W)L'
 denotes the wage elasticity of labor demand 
in absolute value. Given that L´(W) < 0, in the internal solution, W ≥ Wa. 
The percentage deviation of the negotiated wage over the alternative Wa - 
the "wage markup" - is equal to the inverse of the excess of the demand 
elasticity over unity. The wage set will be higher the lower is the elasticity 
of demand. In the optimal solution, for positive wages, we will necessarily 
have that ηL,W > 1. Also: 
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adW
dW
  =  
(W)L" ) W-(W   (W)L' 2
(W)L'
a+
       (3) 
 
For second-order conditions of problem (1) to hold, the denominator of 
(3) is negative 6 . Hence, being labor supply negatively sloped, (3) is 
positive. If labor demand is linear, 
adW
dW
 = 
2
1
: a unit increase in the 
alternative increases the optimal wage - earnings of an employed member - 
by 0,5. If labor demand is convex, i.e., L"(W) > 0, 
adW
dW
 > 
2
1
, if it is concave 
and L"(W) < 0, 
adW
dW
 < 
2
1
. If 
adW
dW
 < 1, the difference between W and Wa 
shrinks when the alternative rises; hence, this happens necessarily with 
linear or concave demand, but may or may not be the case if demand is 
convex. 
The union maximand increases with Wa. Denote by U* its value at the 
equilibrium solution; then, 
adW
*dU
 = M – L > 0. 
 
2. For a particular union, the alternative wage, Wa, is taken as 
exogenous. It may be seen as the weighted average of the unemployment 
benefit, b, received in case of unemployment, and the wage (also 
exogenous to the union control) received if the individuals get employment 
in other sectors. That is, unemployed members compete for other (any) 
unions´ jobs. If all sectors are unionised, this wage will equalize across 
sectors. Let u denote the unemployment rate in the economy:  
 
u  =  
M
L(W) - M
         (4) 
 
Then: 
 
Wa  =  u b + (1-u) W        (5) 
 
Replacing in (2) 7: 
 
W  =  
WL,
1 -u 
u b
η
  =  
WL,u 
1 - 1
b
η
   ;    W ≥ b     (6) 
and      
b
b -W 
  =  
1 - u 
1
WL,η
 ;  
W
b -W 
  =  
WL,u 
1
η
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In the optimal solution - see (6) -: 
ηL,W  >  u
1
  >  1         (7) 
 
3. With an explicit form for L(W), we may be able to derive an explicit 
solution for u and W as a function of b. Using (6) and (4) - considering a 
inelastic labor supply M -, one can show that in internal solutions: 
 
db
dW
  =  
u
u)-(1 (W)L'  (W)L" ) W-(W   (W)L' 2
(W)L'u 
2
a ++
  =    (8) 
=  
2
a
2
u 1  
(W)L'
(W)L" ) W-(W u 
u
++
  
 
Hence, the wage and the unemployment rate will increase with the 
(exogenous) unemployment benefit b. If, but not only if, u < 0,5, (8) will be 
smaller than 1 – and equilibrium wages will rise by less than an exogenous 
increase in the unemployment benefit. Also, if demand is linear, (W)L"  = 
0, 
db
dW
 = 2
2
u1
u
+
 ≤ 
2
1
< 1. If demand is concave, (W)L"  < 0, and also 
db
dW
 < 
2
2
u1
u
+
 ≤ 
2
1
; if demand is convex, (W)L"  > 0, 
db
dW
 > 2
2
u1
u
+
. 
db
*dU
 = (M – L) u – (M – L) 
u
u) - (1 2
 
db
dW
, nonnegative and, around the 
same unemployment level, smaller than 
adW
*dU
 = M - L = M u was. 
However, the union´s utility function is incorrectly perceived ex-post; with 
respect to the relevant maximand, 
db
  L)] - (M b  Ld[W +
 = M – L - L 
u
u-1
db
dW
 = 
u
1
 
db
*dU
, the effect is larger than 
db
*dU
, but still expected to be 
smaller than 
adW
*dU
. 
4. The “unsolved”, so to speak, equation (6) is useful to interpret 
estimated (observed) relations between unemployment and wages. Assume 
the unemployment benefit level can be controlled for, or is constant over a 
particular sample – of time series, or of cross section data; then, provided 
the wage elasticity of demand is the same for all observed units (an 
economy in different years; or in different sample regions; or in different 
industry sectors or professions) – and the same institutional arrangements, 
i.e., monopoly union wage-setting -, autonomous changes/differences in 
labor demand (for instance, business cycle induced movements; regional 
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size effects; industry-profession labor demand specificities) will lead to 
different wage-(un)employment mixes across units, but over that stable 
relation between the two aggregates. Under those circumstances, (6) asserts 
that the higher is the wage level, the lower will be the unemployment rate 8 
in the economy. 
5. For any variable wage-elasticity demand curve: 
 
dW
dη
  =  -  
L(W)
(W)L" W  L´(W) )  (1 WL, ++η        (9) 
 
In the optimal solution given by (3), ηL,W > 1; given second order 
conditions of problem (1), provided Wa L"(W) is small or non positive (e.g., 
if demand is linear or concave, or around Wa = 0 if convex), dW
dη
 > 0. 
du
dη
 
will have the same sign. Whatever causes a rise in W (and u) will increase 
the equilibrium wage elasticity of demand.  
Assume a constant elasticity labor demand function, L(W, ηL,W). Then, 
the analysis of the previous paragraph does not apply. Consider, in this 
case, a change in the elasticity of demand ηL,W; differentiating the last 
equation of (6) and using (4): 
 
ηd
dW
  =  
M
 L b - 1)-u ( 
u) - 
M
 (L b
W
2 ηη
η
η
        (10) 
 
ηd
du
  =  
ηη
ηη
 L b - 1)-u ( M
1)-u ( L -Lu  b
W
2
2
W         (11) 
 
If Lη = η∂
∂L
 ≤ 0 9, the wage rate decreases with η; if Lη is small in 
absolute value (or not too negative), the unemployment rate will also 
decrease with η10.  
Denote the industry level elasticity of demand by ηI. The lower is this 
elasticity, the higher will be the wage. If decentralizing bargaining – e.g., 
moving from industry bargaining to firm-level bargaining - has the same 
effects as increasing the elasticity of the implicit aggregate labor demand 
function, considerations pertaining to the interpretation of (10) and (11) 
apply. Hence, decentralized (firm) level bargaining will lead to a lower 
wage, once labor demand is seen as more elastic. 
This result would seem to suggest that if bargaining was staged at the 
economy-wide level - because labor demand is even less elastic -, we would 
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observe an even higher wage rate. This need not be the case, as we will see 
in the next section. 
 
3. Economy-wide bargaining 
1. Consider an economy-wide bargaining process. The alternative wage 
will be the unemployment benefit b with probability one - (2) will apply 
with Wa = b:  
 
W  =  
WL,
1 - 1 
 b
η
   ;   W ≥ b        (12) 
and      
b
b -W 
  =  
1 - 
1
WL,η
  ;  
W
b -W 
  =  
WL,
1
η
   
 
Let Wi denote wage with type i bargaining, i = I (industry), G (economy-
wide). Then: 
 
G
I
W
W
  =  
II
G
u
1 - 1
1 - 1
η
η
         (13) 
 
The ratio will be higher: 
- the higher ηG  
- the lower ηI  
- the lower the unemployment rate in the industry bargaining, uI. 
The ratio will be larger than one as long as: 
 
ηG > ηI uI         (14) 
 
Given that (for interior solutions) 0 < uI < 1, even if ηG < ηI, we expect 
this condition to hold; if ηG = ηI, the wage with industry-level bargaining 
will be higher than with economy-wide bargaining. The reason lies on the 
fact that for a industry union, the alternative wage is perceived as higher 
than with economy-wide bargaining 11. 
2. The previous comments apply regardless of whether aggregate 
demand shifts or not when we move from industry to economy-wide 
bargaining. Let us assume that it does not – the only difference comes from 
enhanced employment competition of dismissed employees in the former.  
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As L'(WI) (WI - Wa) + L(WI) = 0 – first-order conditions of problem (1) - 
and Wa ≥ b, L'(WI) (WI - b) + L(WI) = L'(WI) (Wa - b) < 0 (Or given (3) and 
because Wa ≥ b), WG ≤ WI. Then, economy-wide bargaining will lead to a 
lower wage – yet, to a higher wage bill, once wage-elasticity of demand is 
larger than one. 
The unemployment benefit “wage multiplier” becomes, under economy-
wide bargaining, (3), replacing Wa by b: 
 
db
dW
  =  
(W)L" b) -(W   (W)L' 2
(W)L'
+
  =      (15) 
=  
(W)L'
(W)L" b) -(W   2
1
+
  
 
(15) is positive and if labor demand is linear, 
db
dW
 = 
2
1
. Comparing with 
(8), we conclude that if the term in L"(W) is negligible – e.g., demand is 
linear or b is close to the equilibrium wage -, the impact of a unit increase in 
b on W is much smaller under industry bargaining – and smaller than u 
times the economy-wide “multiplier”. 
db
*dU
 = M – L > 0. As discussed previously, it is expected to be larger 
than under industry bargaining. 
Assuming unions are utilitarian, members are risk neutral and a fixed 
and exogenous unemployment benefit level: 
Proposition 1. 1.1. Economy-wide (corporate) bargaining will lead to a 
lower wage than industry-wide bargaining if (in equilibrium) 
 
ηG > ηI uI 
 
The intuition behind the result lies on the fact that in decentralized 
bargaining the probability of employment outside a particular union is 
seen as positive - and, thus, higher than in corporate bargaining. 
1.2. If the unemployment benefit is (exogenously) set around the wage 
rate (and for the same labor demand in the two cases), or demand is linear, 
the positive impact on the wage (negative impact on employment) of a unit 
increase in the unemployment benefit is magnified with economy-wide 
bargaining.  
1.3. With industry-wide bargaining, the “unemployment benefit 
multiplier” will be smaller than one when the unemployment rate is 
smaller than 0,5. It will never be larger than 
2
1
 if labor demand is linear or 
concave. 
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4. Introducing income taxes 
1. Consider that we have taxes, s per unit of earned income, on 
employed workers and the union responds to after-tax wages. The 
utilitarian union with risk neutral individuals will solve 
 
Max   (W - s) L + Wa (M - L)        (16) 
L, W 
s.t.: L = L(W) 
 
The union will choose: 
 
W  =  
WL,
a
1 - 1
s  W
η
+
   ;  W - s ≥ Wa  or  W ≥ Wa + s        (17) 
 
One can show, in line with (3) and (8), that: 
 
adW
dW
  =  
ds
dW
  =  
(W)L" ) W- s -(W   (W)L' 2
(W)L'
a+
      (18) 
 
The gross wage rate increases with the alternative Wa and unit tax s 
according to the same multiplier – second-order conditions require the 
denominator to be negative. If unions respond to after-tax wages, because 
ds
dW
 > 0, they will choose higher unemployment and equilibrium wages 
than if they respond to gross wages. However, the net wage rate may 
decrease with the tax rate (iff (18) is smaller than unity); this will occur if 
L"(W) is small.  
adW
*dU
 = M – L and 
ds
*dU
 = - L: a rise in the unemployment benefit will 
increase union´s welfare, an increase in the tax rate will decrease it. 
Assume the unemployment benefit is not taxed – unemployed workers 
are recipients in the fiscal system. Then, replacing Wa for b in (17) and (18), 
we obtain, respectively, the wage curve and the benefit and tax rate 
multipliers with economy-wide bargaining.  
2. If union(s)´ behavior is not fully centralized, 
 
Wa = u b + (1-u) (W - s)        (19) 
 
Replacing in (17) and solving for W, 
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W  =  
WL,u 
1 - 1
s  b
η
+
   ;  W - s ≥ b or W ≥ b + s     (20) 
 
The union responds to an increase in b, the unemployment benefit, in 
the same way as to an increase in s, taxes.  
 
db
dW
  =  
ds
dW
  =  
u
u) - (1 (W)L'  (W)L" ) W- s -(W   (W)L' 2
(W)L'u  
2
a ++
    (21) 
 
(21) is still positive but smaller than (18) – with Wa replaced by b in (18) 
- under the same restrictions of the previous comparison of (15) and (8). If 
(but not only if) u < 0,5, or demand is linear, (21) will be smaller than 1 and 
net wages will decrease with s. 
db
*dU
 = u (M – L) – (M – L) 
u
u) - (1 2
 
db
dW
 > 0, and 
ds
*dU
 = - L - u L (1 + 
u
u  - 1
 
ds
dW
). Taxes seem to have a more negative effect on perceived utility 
than with economy-wide bargaining. 
Proposition 2. If unions respond to net wages. 
2.1. The tax and the unemployment benefit have similar treatment in the 
"bargained real wage curve". 
2.2. The equilibrium wage and unemployment rate respond (positively 
and) equally to tax as to unemployment benefit changes (even if union´s 
welfare decreases with taxes and increases with the unemployment benefit 
level).  
2.3. After-tax wages decrease with the unit tax rate if (but not only if) 
demand is linear or concave. Under industry bargaining, also if (but not 
only if) the unemployment rate is smaller than 0,5. 
2.4. Proposition 1. still holds. 
3. If unions recognize that taxes enter the alternative wage, they could 
behave as if 
 
Max   (W - s) L + Wa* (M - L) – s* (M - L) 
L, W 
s.t.: L = L(W) 
 
where Wa* = u b + (1 – u) W and s* = (1 – u) s; under decentralized 
bargaining, s* is outside the union control. Then, we can show that: 
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W  =  
WL,
a
1 - 1
su    *W
η
+
    ;   W - u s ≥ Wa* or  W ≥ Wa* + u s 
 
Replacing Wa* and solving for W, we arrive at (20). We therefore do not 
complicate the analysis further with this refinement. 
 
5. Transfers: A balanced budget constraint 
1. Suppose taxes are levied to finance the unemployment benefit under a 
balanced budget constraint: 
 
u b  =  (1-u) s         (22) 
 
Yet, unions fail to recognize it in their decisions.  
The comparison of this scenario with the one of the previous section 
depends on the tax level. If taxes, without intentional restriction, are set at 
the level that insures (22), equilibrium wages are the same. If, departing 
from (17) or (20), to insure the budget constraint, the government must 
increase the tax rate, equilibrium wages (and unemployment) increase, 
according to (18) and (21) respectively. However, it may not have to 
increase the tax rate when, in the previous equilibrium, u b > (1-u) s – that 
will depend on the size of the deficit, u b – (1 – u) s, and on the sign of  
 
ds
s] u) - (1  bd[u −
  =  - (1 – u) (1 - ηL,W W
s  b +
 
ds
dW
)    (23) 
 
This can be, in either of the two bargaining systems, positive or negative. 
For economy-wide bargaining and linear demand, if but not only if ηL,W < 
3; for industry-wide bargaining, if (but not only if) ηL,W < 2
2
u
u  u) - (1 +
 = 
2
2
u
u) - (1
 + 
u
1
, (23) is negative and an increase in the tax rate closes a 
positive deficit 12. 
The previous statements can be explained as follows: when the tax rate 
increases, optimal gross wages increase - according to the previous section 
findings; hence, also unemployment. Then, two counteractive effects are in 
place with respect to the total impact on the deficit of the rise in s: on the 
one hand, the direct negative effect of the increase in the unit fiscal 
contribution. But, on the other, the increase in the unemployment insurance 
bill due to the larger number of unemployed, and decrease of (employed) 
taxpayers – a positive effect(s), expected large if labor demand reacts 
sizeably (i.e., labor demand elasticity is large) to the implicit rise in wages. 
If the second prevails, the unit tax rate should decrease to close a positive 
deficit. 
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(23) may (also) be positive or negative at zero taxes. If u b – (1 –u) s 
changes smoothly with s, and we depart from a positive deficit at s = 0, the 
deficit may be increasing or decreasing as we rise s - (23) may be positive or 
negative. But the deficit must start decreasing with s somewhere and be 
decreasing with s when we achieve the balance. For a positive (23) around 
the balanced budget under such smoothness, either there are multiple 
solutions for the s that solves the balanced budget; or the internal 
conditions found for the problem with no taxes do not guarantee 0 < u < 1 
(0 < L(W) < M) – that is, the interior solution for s=0 is not available.  
2. Assume industry bargaining. Replacing (22) in (20): 
 
W  =  
u) -(1 )
u 
1 - (1
b
WL,η
 13  ;  W ≥ 
u - 1
   b
 or W (1 – u) ≥ b     (24) 
 
In internal solutions, the wage multiplied by the employment 
probability in the economy must be larger than the unemployment benefit. 
The relation between W and u in the bargained real wage curve is: 
- negative if u is low:    
 
1
WL,η
  <  u  <  2/1
WL,
1
η
  
- positive if u is high:      u  >  2/1
WL,
1
η
  >  
 
1
WL,η
  
(Note that we must be working - see (17) - in a point where ηL,W >  u
1
  > 
1.)  
This type of inversion seems to occur for some wage curves' estimates 
using local data surveyed in Blanchflower & Oswald (1994): when 
unemployment and unemployment squared are introduced in the wage 
regressions, the first coefficient is negative and the second-one is positive. 
Condition (24) is, thus, appropriate for the comparison of wages set 
under different demand curves. Let us assume a particular economy and 
pursue the methodology of the previous sections. 
Inserting (22) in (19),  
 
Wa = W (1-u)          (25) 
 
Denote by WI the solution of (1) L'(WI) (WI - Wa) + L(WI) = 0 – first-
order conditions of problem (1) – and Wa, the alternative wage function (5), 
Wa ≥ b. Let WI
s be the (new) solution of (16) combined with (19) and (22) 
that yield Wa
s: L'(WI
s) (WI
s – sI
s - Wa
s) + L(WI
s) = L'(WI
s) [WI
s – sI
s - WI
s 
(1-uI
s)] + L(WI
s) = 0. Then L'(WI
s) [WI
s – Wa] + L(WI
s) + L'(WI
s) [Wa - sI
s - 
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WI
s (1 - uI
s)] = 0; at WI
s, Wa - sI
s - WI
s (1 - uI
s) = uI
s b - sI
s < 0, L'(WI
s) 
(WI
s – Wa) + L(WI
s) < 0 and the maximand of (1) is already decreasing at 
WI
s. The denominator of (8) is negative: L'(WI
s) [WI
s – Wa(WI
s)] + L(WI
s) 
decreases with WI
s; hence, WI < WI
s 14. 
Using (25): 
 
db
dW
  =           (26) 
=  
)]
u
1 - ( - u) - (1 1) - [( (W)L'  (W)L" ) W- s -(W   (W)L' 2
(W)L' 
u - 1
u 
WL,WL,a ηη++
 = 
 
=  
)]
u
1 - ( - u) - (1 1) - [(  
(W)L'
(W)L" ) W- s -(W   2
u - 1
u 
WL,WL,a ηη++
  
 
(26) may be negative or positive 15. It will be positive if (but not only if) 
equilibrium conditions yield ηL,W < 2
2
u
u  u) - (1 +
. If positive, around the 
same solution for (20), it will be larger than (21) 16. 
We can show that: 
 
db
ds
  =  
u - 1
u
 + (ηL,W – u
1
) 
db
dW
      (27) 
 
The required unit tax rate to insure (22) may increase or decrease with 
the unemployment benefit. (27) has the same sign as 
db
dW
 (of the 
denominator of the second version in (26)). Also, or, rather alternatively, 
once s is seen as endogenously constrained by the balanced budget 
requirement, 
 
ds
dW
  =  
 u) - (1 1) - ( (W)L'  (W)L" ) W- s -(W   (W)L' 2
(W)L'
WL,a η++
   (28) 
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ds
dW
 is always positive. If demand is linear or concave, it is smaller than 
2
1
. Around the s that insures a balanced budget, (28) will be larger than 
(21) if (but not only if) ηL,W < 2
2
u
u  u) - (1 +
. 
db
*dU
 = - M – L - [(1 – u) (M – L) (ηL,W – 1) + L (ηL,W – u
1
)] 
db
dW
 and 
may be positive or negative. One can show that the sign will be symmetric 
to the one of 
db
dW
. This is in contrast with the previous scenario: on the one 
hand, an increase in the unemployment benefit may actually decrease 
union´s welfare; secondly, when it does, we observe a rise in wages – and 
in the unit tax rate. Yet, 
ds
*dU
 < 0 always. 
3. Assume that global bargaining is in place. Then, in (17), Wa = b and, 
considering the budget constraint (22), we can derive: 
 
W  =  
u)-(1 )1 - (1
b
WL,η
   ;  W ≥ 
u - 1
   b
 or W (1 – u) ≥ b   (29) 
 
The wage set in the economy, for given demand elasticity ηL,W and 
unemployment benefit b, will vary positively with the unemployment rate 
in the economy. 
Comparing this situation, (29), with the one in section 2, in which unions 
ignore s, (12), we conclude that, provided labor demand elasticity is 
constant, wages, are now higher. That is, if we compare two economies 
with the same unemployment benefit and demand elasticity, even if 
demands differ in other respects, under global bargaining wages will be 
higher for the economy with tax funding. (We cannot say the same for the 
non-coordinated case because there, also u will vary). 
Denote by WG the solution of (12) L'(WG) (WG - b) + L(WG) = 0 – first-
order conditions of problem (1) - and WG ≥ b; and WG
s, the (new) solution 
of (29) combined with (22), L'(WG
s) (WG
s – s - b) + L(WG
s) = L'(WG
s) 
[WG
s – b] + L(WG
s) - L'(WG
s) s = 0; at WG
s, L'(WG
s) (WG
s – b) + L(WG
s) < 
0 and the maximand of (12) is already decreasing: WG < WG
s 17. Gross 
wages and unemployment are higher under the tax. 
Moreover: 
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W - s  =  
η
1 - 1
 b
  
u -1
)1 - (1u  - 1
η
        (30) 
 
That is, if η is constant, after-tax wages will be higher than gross wages 
were in the case in which taxes were ignored or absent. 
Simulating the impact of the unit increase in b as before: 
 
db
dW
  =  22 L / M (W)L' b  (W)L" b) - s -(W   (W)L' 2
(W)L'  
u-1
1
++
 =   (31) 
 
=  
η  
(W)L'
(W)L" b) - s -(W   3
u-1
1
−+
 
 
If positive, the multiplier is larger than (18) around the same equilibrium 
and expected to be larger than (26) around the same solution and for b 
close to Wa; however, the unemployment benefit multiplier may be 
negative. Net wages respond to the unemployment benefit according to: 
db
s-dW
 = (2 - ηL,W) db
dW
  -  
u -1
u
, which may be positive or negative. 
Under economy-wide bargaining: 
 
db
ds
  =  
u - 1
u
 + (ηL,W - 1) db
dW
      (32) 
 
The required unit tax rate to insure (22) may increase or decrease with 
the unemployment benefit and one can show that it has the same sign as 
db
dW
. Also, 
 
ds
dW
  =  
u
u) - (1 1) - (
 (W)L'  (W)L" b) - s -(W   (W)L' 2
(W)L' 
u
1
WL,η++
  (33) 
ds
dW
 is always positive and around the solution that insures the budget 
constraint may be larger or smaller than (18). It is expected to be larger than 
(28).  
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db
*dU
 = (M – L) - L 
db
ds
 = - L (ηL,W - 1) db
dW
: the union´s utility and 
wages move in opposite direction when the unemployment benefit 
changes. As under industry bargaining, unions´ welfare moves in the 
opposite direction of the unit tax rate and 
ds
*dU
 < 0. 
4. If we consider more or less coordination in union bargaining we see 
that the comments made in section 2. about the ratio 
G
I
W
W
 apply now to the 
ratio between the aggregate wage bill  – ui, i = I, G, is the unemployment 
rate in the economy under each bargaining arrangement - in the two cases: 
 
)u-(1 W
)u-(1 W
GG
II   =  
GG
II
L W
L W
  =  
II
G
u
1 - 1
1 - 1
η
η
       (34) 
 
It is therefore likely that the wage bill is higher in the decentralized case. 
Moreover, when comparing different economies – represented by different 
membership size, or different populations – the relation between the 
expected wage or gross earnings per member established in (34) is still 
valid (even if not in terms of the wage bill). 
Again, (34) and the previous statement is valid if demand shapes differ 
in the two cases. Suppose aggregate demand at industry level must be 
represented by the same function that at global bargaining, i.e., LI = L(WI), 
as LG = L(WG). We are working in an elastic portion of demand - or, if 
isoelastic, L(W) must have wage elasticity larger than one; hence 
 
WI LI > WG LG    implies    WI < WG      (35) 
 
However, as L'(WI
s) (WI
s – sI
s - Wa
s) + L(WI
s) = 0 – first-order 
conditions that drive (24) - and Wa
s ≥ b, L'(WI
s) (WI
s - sI
s - b) + L(WI
s) < 0; 
if the denominator of the first part of (31) is negative at WI
s – if equilibrium 
wages increase with the unemployment benefit -, WG
s < WI
s. Then, 
economy-wide bargaining will still lead to a lower wage than industry 
bargaining – yet, to a higher wage bill, once wage-elasticity of demand is 
higher than one. (34) is smaller than 1.  
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If the denominator of (31) is positive, the reverse happens: WI
s < WG
s, 
i.e., economy-wide bargaining yields a higher wage and unemployment 
levels, and (35) holds; (34) is larger than 1. 
The intuition behind this second result is that at industry-level 
bargaining the budget constraint effect is transmitted ex post to the 
alternative wage, Wa. Given that industry unions respond to this wage, if 
the ex post maximand is convex in W around the optimal solution, the 
larger perceived income alternative is wage depressant because, as labor 
demand is very elastic, it implies a lower unit tax rate; hence, the solution 
ends up by not being as employment-reducing as with global bargaining. 
Then: 
Assuming unions are utilitarian and members are risk neutral: 
Proposition 3. If taxes are levied on employed members to pay for the 
unemployment compensation, and the budget equivalence is not 
recognized by unions: 
3.1. The "bargained real wage curve" may be positively sloped (at high 
levels of unemployment). It will be positively sloped if there is 
coordination in union negotiations (corporate or global bargaining). 
3.2. Corporate bargaining will lead to a higher after-tax wage than gross 
wage is in the case where before-tax earnings are considered in union´s 
optimisation. 
3.3. The wage bill in industry-wide bargaining will be higher than with 
corporate bargaining if 
 
ηG > ηI uI 
 
It is then likely that in this case the industry-wide bargaining wage will 
be lower than global bargaining one. If labor demand features are 
preserved under the two bargaining arrangements, this statement is only 
valid when wages respond negatively to the unemployment benefit; if they 
respond positively, wages will still be higher under industry-wide 
bargaining. 
3.4. 1.2 of Proposition 1. may still hold, provided gross wages respond 
positively to the unemployment benefit; this will occur if and only if the 
required unit taxes to insure the balanced budget move in the same 
direction of the unemployment benefit. Equilibrium wages and the union´s 
objective function respond in opposite directions to changes in the 
unemployment benefit. 
5. Note that we did not assume that the union fully internalises the 
budget constraint in its decision, which is likely with economy-wide 
bargaining. If we did - and this point can be found in Layard, Nickell & 
Jackman (1991), p. 129-131 -, the union would act as if maximizing the wage 
bill, set wages at unitary labor demand, and would not respond to the 
unemployment benefit 18. Then, the union acts as if Wa in problem (1) is 0. 
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As the wage in the economy increases with Wa – according to (3) -, the 
unions fully internalising the budget constraint works as a decrease in Wa; 
hence, wages and unemployment will be lower than implied by (29). Or, 
due to (9), necessarily positive at Wa = 0, a lower wage elasticity is chosen, 
hence lower wages and unemployment level. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This article inspects the response of labor market equilibrium aggregates 
to the degree of coordination in union bargaining by analysing the features 
of the implicit wage curve. 
The research assumes (closed-shop) monopoly unions that maximize 
collective earnings. It distinguishes the cases of unions responding to 
before and after-tax wages (or that always respond to after-tax wages and 
when wages are not and are levied on employed workers), and where 
(unit) taxes finance the unemployment benefit bill under a balanced budget 
constraint. 
It was shown that if unions respond to gross wages, under plausible 
conditions (and as some empirical evidence seems to support), economy-
wide bargaining will exhibit a lower wage than industry-wide bargaining – 
resulting from the fact that the probability of employment is perceived as 
higher under industry-wide bargaining. 
If unions respond to net wages and earnings taxes finance the 
unemployment insurance fund, the reverse can occur. Under a balanced 
budget constraint, industry-wide bargaining will be consistent with a 
negatively sloped bargained real wage curve for low levels of 
unemployment, and positively sloped when unemployment is high – as 
empirical wage curves based on local disaggregation seem to be. Corporate 
bargaining will lead to a positively sloped wage curve. Under both 
bargaining systems, wages and unemployment are higher than when taxes 
were absent or unions respond to gross earnings. 
In any event, a positive reaction of wages and unemployment to the 
unemployment benefit is magnified with centralized bargaining relative to 
industry bargaining. However, under a balanced budget - worker financed 
- unemployment insurance scheme, that response may become negative. 
 
 
Notes 
* This paper was part of a research presented at the Economics Department of Catholic 
University of Portugal seminar and at 1993 EALE Conference meetings at Maastricht. I am 
grateful for the comments made by participants in both seminars, and specially, to an 
anonymous referee who greatly contributed for the improvement of the final version of 
this paper. Responsibility remains mine. 
2 See, for example, Calmfors & Driffill (1988). Also, Tarantelli (1986). A recent survey of 
international evidence can be found in Flanagan (1999). 
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3 Such theoretical refinements in centralization bargaining have been applied and developed 
in studies such as those of Calmfors & Driffil (1988), Davidson (1988) and Dowrick (1989 
and 1993). 
4 As in Oswald (1982). Holmund & Lundborg (1989) analyse the changes in the equilibrium 
induced by different unemployment insurance funding schemes. 
5 Efficient bargaining would lead to P F
L
 = Wa, with employment being determined by the 
relative strength of the union with respect to the employer one. We shall always assume 
monopoly unions. 
6 If labor demand is linear or concave, second-order conditions are always satisfied. For a 
standard constant elasticity demand, L(W) = A W-η – which is convex in W -, second-order 
conditions are satisfied around the optimal solution (i.e., provided η > 1, required by first-
order conditions). 
7 See Carlin & Soskice (1990), page 391, for the derivation of this expression - the "bargained 
real wage curve". 
8 The empirically observed negative relation between the local unemployment rates and 
wages - well documented in Blanchflower & Oswald (1994) - is, therefore, consistent with 
monopoly union models. And, because the local framework is considered, would apply to 
local (the analog to industry-wide) bargaining. 
9 This is the case for L(W, η
L,W
) = A W-η provided W ≥ 1. 
10 When we compare economies with different labor demand schedules, (9) does not apply; 
(10) and (11) do not apply, in general. Nevertheless, (3) must hold. 
11 Tarantelli (1986) explains his findings of a negative relation between the Okun´s misery 
index (rate of growth of consumer prices plus rate of unemployment) and the degree of 
neocorporatism as being due to "lower risks of free riding" in a "more centralized system 
of industrial relations", thus originating "greater price stability". He argues that free riding 
in less centralized systems leads to a higher real wage level and higher unemployment. 
Layard, Nickell & Jackman (1991) comparing centralized and decentralized union 
bargaining also arrive at this relation between the corresponding outcomes - also 
explaining the fact as being due to the unemployment benefit which is seen as the 
alternative with coordinated union behavior - and complete coverage - is in place. Their 
argument differs from ours in that they conclude that for given coverage there is no reason 
to believe that "intermediate levels of centralization are bad" - we are comparing scenarios 
with the same (complete) coverage, therefore, we enlarge their conclusions to intermediate 
centralization. These authors focus on the corner solution - full employment - in the 
centralized bargaining case. 
12 We could not find any sensitivity of these conclusions to the imposition of (22).  
13 Note that also W =  
WL,
1 -u 
s
η
 . We assume that the government sets b, its policy target, 
and endogenously determines the tax rate under (22) to ensure the balanced budget. 
Hence, the bargained real wage curve is seen as (24) and not this expression in s. 
14 Once wages decrease with the tax rate - see (21) – this was to be expected. 
15 Hart & Moutos (1995), section 5.4, discuss the sign effects of the unemployment benefit 
increase on the wage rate under efficient bargaining in a two-sector model. They find that 
the sign of the multiplier on total employment becomes positive as a balanced budget 
constraint, recognized by unions and firms, analogous to (22) is introduced. 
16 This comparison is always valid around the same equilibrium of the cases of both sections. 
17 This was implied by (18). 
18 In this context, if unions are utilitarian and union members risk averse, Oswald (1982) 
proves that the wage will move in the same direction as the unemployment benefit (He 
considers a proportional income tax).  
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